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Complete Abstract:
In automated negotiation systems consisting of self-interested agents, contracts have traditionally been
binding. Leveled commitment contracts - i.e. contracts where each party can decommit by paying a
predetermined penalty - were recently shown to improve expected social welfare even if agents decommit
insincerely in Nash equilibrium. Such contracts differ based on whether agents have to declare their
decommitting decisions sequentially or simultaneously, and whether or not agents have to pay the
penalties if both decommit. For a given contract, these protocols lead to different decommitting
thresholds and probabilities. However, this paper shows that, surprisingly, each protocol leads to the
same expected social welfare when the contract price and penalties are optimized for each protocol. Our
derivations allow agents to construct optimal leveled commitment contracts. We also show that such
integrative bargaining does not hinder distributive bargaining: the excess can be divided arbitrarily (as
long as each agent benefits), e.g. equally, without compromising optimality. Revenue equivalence ceases
to hold if agents are not risk neutral. A contract optimization service is offered on the web as part of
eMediator, our next generation electronic commerce server.

